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Abstract
The banking system is modeled in a closed system of ﬁnancial accounts, whereby the equilibrium
volume of bank intermediation between households and corporates reﬂects structural parameters such as
household preferences, comparative cost structures of heterogeneous banks, loan demand of corporates,
and the diﬀerence between the borrowing rate and the deposit facility rate of the central bank. The
model also allows understanding the link between this diﬀerence (the width of the central bank standing
facilities corridor) and the stance of monetary policy, and how this link changes during a ﬁnancial crisis.
It is shown how the narrowing of the standing facilities corridor can make more accommodating the
stance of monetary policy in a ﬁnancial crisis.5
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Non technical summary
One of the features of the recent crisis was the break-down of interbank markets which in most countries lie
at the heart of the monetary transmission mechanism, as they facilitate the distribution of liquidity across
the ﬁnancial system and the determination of short- as well as longer-term interest rates. The ﬂip side of
money market dislocations was central bank “intermediation”, i.e. simultaneous use by the banking system
of central bank liquidity providing and absorbing operations. Though two-sided recourse to central bank
liquidity facilities may occasionally occur even in normal times, largely due to market frictions, the fact
that it happened in a persistent manner, in large scale, over a long period of time indicates that a more
fundamental factor must have been at play.
The present paper provides a very simple and relevant intuition for why in a ﬁnancial crisis such a
sudden massive central bank intermediation is demanded by the banking system. The reasoning is based on
a structural model of ﬁnancial system represented by a closed set of ﬁnancial accounts featuring households,
corporates, the banking sector (represented by two banks) and the central bank. The equilibrium volume
of bank intermediation between households and corporates is shown to reﬂect structural parameters such as
household preferences, comparative cost structures of heterogeneous banks, loan demand of corporates, and
the diﬀerence between the borrowing rate and the deposit facility rate of the central bank. Thus, the model
captures the interaction between static diﬀerences of competitiveness within a heterogeneous banking system
and the monetary policy implementation framework, yielding testable predictions regarding the eﬀects of a
ﬁnancial crisis on interbank market activity and on the length of the central bank balance sheet.
In particular, the model predicts that in a ﬁnancial crisis characterised by the break-down of interbank
markets, the narrower the spread between the central bank borrowing and deposit rates: (i) the larger
the central bank intermediation volume; (ii) the lower the interbank lending volume; (iii) the higher total
intermediation between households and corporates through the ﬁnancial system, and (iv) the lower the
interest rates to be paid by corporates for obtaining loans. The latter two also mean that the narrower the
corridor, the lower will be the contraction via ﬁnancial intermediation triggered by a ﬁnancial crisis. The
structural model presented in this paper adds another powerful link between implementation technique and
the stance of monetary policy, and how policy can react to this by using the width of the corridor and/or
the length of the central bank balance sheet as an independent policy variable.6
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1 Introduction
Monetary policy implementation is about steering the short end of the yield curve, which, together with
adequate communication on future policies, impacts on medium and long-term interest rates via the expec-
tations hypothesis of the term structure of interest rates. The question arises why central banks do not
control short-term interest rates simply, transparently and eﬀectively by committing to collect and to supply
overnight funds at the relevant target interest rate, i.e. set a zero width overnight rate corridor through
standing facilities. Instead, central banks (i) tend to supply central bank money through open market oper-
ations only from time to time (but on a regular basis) and partially using auction procedures with some rate
and/or quantity uncertainty, and (ii) limit overnight rate volatility only partially through standing facilities
at penalty rates, i.e. to set a non-zero corridor to overnight rates. This paper investigates why central
banks seem to prefer the complicated and imperfect to a simple and fully eﬀective approach to the control
of short-term interest rates.
Under the current practice of most central banks, the rates of the standing facilities are often ﬁxed at a
“penalty level”, i.e. such that the use of the facilities is normally not attractive relative to market rates. The
interest rates on the two facilities then form the ceiling and the ﬂoor of a corridor within which short-term
money market rates ﬂuctuate. Such a corridor system is currently applied by the Bank of England, the
ECB, The US Fed, and the central banks of Canada, Australia, and New Zealand among many others, with
however large diﬀerences in the width of the corridor. For example, the Bank of Canada has applied over the
last years a tight corridor of normally 50 basis points, with a temporary lowering to 25 basis points during
the ﬁnancial crisis. The Swedish Riksbank, uses a wider corridor of 100 bp (150 bp until June 2009), though
it conducts also daily ﬁne-tuning operations at a spread 10 bp around the main policy rate, implying a de
facto considerably narrower corridor. The ECB has set most of the time a corridor width of 200 basis points,
with however a corridor of 50 basis points during a few weeks in January 1999 and some variations during
the recent crisis. The UK applied for some years a 200 basis points corridor with however a 50 basis points
corridor applying on each last day of a monthly reserve maintenance period. It generally narrowed down the
width of its corridor to 50 basis points during the ﬁnancial crisis. Also Hungary has applied mostly a 200
basis points corridor, but again with a temporary narrowing during the crisis. Finally, Poland set a constant
300 basis points corridor for the last years.
Besides contributing a new simple but powerful theory of the role of the central bank standing facilities
corridor for the interbank market and the monetary policy stance, the paper also provides for the ﬁrst
time a clean representation of monetary policy implementation and bank intermediation in a closed system
of ﬁnancial accounts, allowing to understand better the nature and control of key central bank asset and
liability items and overcome related misunderstandings (see e.g. Bindseil, 2004).7
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*)The Bank of England’s wide corridor would be applied only within the reserve maintenance period, and on the ﬁnal day of
reserve maintenance period it would be narrowed to 50 bp.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 surveys relevant literature and outlines the contri-
bution of this paper. Section 3 presents the building blocks of the model. Next, section 4 derives the main
conclusions of the model for diﬀerent ﬁnancial system environments. Section 5 presents a stylized simulation
of the model. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2 Review of related literature and motivation
2.1 Optimal width of the standing facilities corridor
The academic literature on the optimal width of the standing facilities corridor set by central banks is rather
recent. Statements of central banks since the 1990s on the optimal width of the corridor are reviewed in
Bindseil and Jablecki (2011), while for instance Woodford (2003), Bindseil (2004) or Whitesell (2006) discuss
the general functioning of standing facilities corridors set by central banks.
One strand of literature explicitly asks the question about the optimal width of the interest rate corridor.
Berentsen and Monnet (2008) are the ﬁrst to propose a dynamic general equilibrium model of a channel
system (i.e. a standing facilities corridor) with a welfare maximizing central bank, a money market, and
commercial banks subject to idiosyncratic liquidity shocks. The key result of the model is that if the
opportunity cost of holding collateral is positive, then it is optimal to apply a positive spread on standing
facilities. Moreover, the paper yields the interesting result that a central bank has two equivalent options
for implementing a given policy: it can either shift the corridor while keeping the spread constant, or it can8
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change the spread. The latter result will be conﬁrmed in the present, rather diﬀerent model. In contrast,
collateral scarcity and idiosyncratic liquidity shocks do not play any role in our model.
Berentsen, Marchesiani, and Waller (2010) explicitly ask if controlling the market interest rate is the
objective, then why not set the spread to zero? Doing so allows the central bank to perfectly control the
money market rate. The authors show in their model (which is again a general dynamic equilibrium with
idiosyncratic liquidity shocks) that this is driven by ﬁscal ramiﬁcations associated with paying interest on
deposits. If the central bank sets its target rate at the deposit rate, the central bank would actually need to
make substantial interest payments. Without a portfolio of assets that generates a ﬂow of income, the central
bank must be able to either levy taxes or have the Treasury do so in order to make the interest payments.
This power to ﬁnance interest payments on reserves may be limited for several reasons. If it is limited, the
optimal corridor width is strictly positive. With the present’s model focus on a closed system of ﬁnancial
accounts, the results of Berentsen et al seem diﬃcult to replicate, since the central bank is structurally
proﬁtable regardless of any outright portfolio because of the non-remunerated monetary base its issues, and
the remuneration of assets its hold. A lengthening of its balance sheet is income neutral (in the case of a
zero corridor) or even increases central bank income (in the case of a positive spread).
Finally, Bindseil and Jablecki (2011) model the role of the width of the corridor for the turnover of the
money market and the average length of the central bank balance sheet using a stochastic model of daily
liquidity shocks within a closed system of ﬁnancial accounts. While the present paper starts from a similar
system of ﬁnancial accounts, and also allows to explain the eﬀects of the corridor on the size of interbank
lending and the length of the central bank balance sheet it does not rely on any stochastic short-term shocks,
but on structural diﬀerences between banks with regard to their deposit collection and lending technology.
2.2 Merits of an active interbank market
T h es e c o n dk e ys t r a n do ft h el i t e r a t u r ef o c u s e so nt h ei m p o r t a n c eo fa na c t i v ei n t e r b a n km o n e ym a r k e t .
Since the model will demonstrate (as other models have, in diﬀerent ways) that the width of the standing
facilities corridor is a key determinant of money market activity, it is crucial to understand the role of the
interbank market to be able to conclude on the optimal width of the central bank standing facilities corridor.
Given that the overnight market for reserves is largely dominated by the central bank, Wiseman (2007)
argues that it is debatable to what extent it actually shares the economic virtues of a market: “Under
various assumptions, mostly true, a market discovers the price that maximizes the sum of the produces and
consumer surpluses... Markets, therefore, have the eﬀect of discovering the eﬃcient price. But markets are
not costless. For a bank to be a participant in this market will require two traders, at least two settlement9
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staﬀ, risk management people, auditors, and computers and space for all these people. In principle, this may
be a price worth paying if the market discovered a price that maximized a surplus. But, of course, all this
market paraphernalia is there to “discover” a price that is actually set by a committee. This is not even a
real market: this is a pretend market, a Potemkin market – all appearance and no function.”
Irrespective of the validity of Wiseman’s argument, an interbank market may have another notable fea-
ture, brought up originally by Rochet and Tirole (1996), namely that interbank exposures generate incentives
for banks to monitor one another’s risks. The latter point is taken up by Hoerova and Monnet (2010) who
also – similarly as in the present paper – raise the question why the standing facilities corridor is not set
to zero, and “in other words, why do central banks enable the money market to exist?” Following Rochet
and Tirole (1996), Hoerova and Monnet (2010) exlore the idea that the function of the money market is
market discipline, and that money market induced discipline is an ex ante provision of incentives to banks
to conduct business in a sage and sound manner.
The theoretical observation concerning disciplining eﬀects of money market is well corroborated by the
empirical research of Furﬁne (2001), King (2008) and Angelini, Nobili, and Picillo (2009) who document
that, indeed, banks with worse risk proﬁles (characterized e.g. by high ratios of non-performing loans or low
capital adequacy ratios) tend to pay higher rates on overnight funds than those with better risk proﬁles.
If there were no market – as in a zero corridor regime – banks would transact only with the central bank
which would reduce their risk awareness. Hence, even if the market for central bank reserves does not – as a
market optimally should – discover the eﬃcient price that maximizes the consumer and producer surpluses,
it can still, according to those authors, fulﬁll an important economic function of facilitating a process of
counterparty risk assessment and peer monitoring. One potential counterargument on this “monitoring”
function of the interbank market, at least in the context of the issue of the optimal width of the interest rate
corridor, is that suﬃcient other forms of interbank exposures would probably remain: securities holdings,
longer term interbank lending and/or OTC derivatives. Moreover, the need to monitor counterparties in
view of information asymmetries cannot be a purpose per se.
Bilateral exposures might potentially also be a channel through which a default of one bank spreads to
other ﬁnancial institutions, with signiﬁcant negative welfare eﬀects. Such contagious-prone feature of banks’
linkages is modeled theoretically e.g. by Allen and Gale (2000) and Freixas, Parigi, and Rochet (2000)
who show that the strength of the propagation mechanism will depend on the exact pattern of interbank
exposures. Thus, the literature on interbank contagion - while in principle not opposed to active interbank
markets as such - might weaken the argument on the economic merits of an active interbank market.10
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2.3 Structural diﬀerences across banks and returns to scale of banking activities
The model proposed in the present paper derives an equilibrium level of ﬁnancial intermediation in a closed
system of ﬁnancial accounts taking explicit assumptions on the cost functions of two banks behaving com-
petitively. Banks intermediate between depositors and corporates, and the resulting intermediation depends
explicitly on the eﬃciency of interbank intermediation either through interbank markets or through the cen-
tral bank. Banks are assumed to behave competitively, and to have each speciﬁc increasing marginal costs of
both deposit collection and corporate loan provision. Rochet and Tirole (1996) already noted the structural
reasons for an interbank market (or central bank intermediation) in the form of cost diﬀerentials between
banks in deposit collection and loan provision, which are also at the core of the present paper: “Some banks,
perhaps due to their regional implantation, are good in collecting deposits, but have poor investment oppor-
tunities. In contrast, some other banks, such as the money centre banks, have plenty of such opportunities or
else are suﬃciently large to aﬀord the large ﬁxed costs associated with complex derivative or other high tech
ﬁnancial markets. It then seems natural for the former banks to lend to the latter.” Structural comparative
advantages between banks as discussed by Rochet and Tirole will drive in the present paper the interbank
market and central bank intermediation.
Woodford (2010), discussing the general integration of ﬁnancial intermediation into macroeconomic anal-
ysis, devotes particular attention to how the cost functions of the banking system drive the eventual extent
of intermediation and the eventual spreads between deposit and loan rates - both being also explained in
the current paper. In particular, Woodford (2010, 29-30) assumes, as we do, a “demand for intermediation
schedule” and a corresponding “supply of intermediation service” function. The former is driven by the
diﬀerence between the deposit supply and loan demand functions, while the volume of lending (and the
spread) depends according to Woodford (2010, 29) on“the capacity of the ﬁnancial sector to supply this [the
intermediation] service at a margin low enough for the service to be demanded.” Furthermore, Woodford
(2010, 29-30) assumes that “intermediaries have costs of originating and servicing loans, or of managing
their portfolios, such that in competitive equilibrium a spread will prevail that reﬂects the marginal cost of
lending”and provides a number of reasons why marginal costs of loan provision should be increasing, such as
natural expertise in only a limited market, capital constraints, etc. In the present paper, an intermediation
supply function of the ﬁnancial system is derived explicitly on the basis of simple marginal cost functions
of competitive banks, whereby the role of the interbank market spreads and central bank facilities is taken
into account as key factors in view of the comparative advantages of diﬀerent banks as described above
by Rochet and Tirole (1996). However, in contrast to Woodford (2010), the present paper assumes that
deposit collection is also subject to increasing marginal costs. Indeed, shifts in the marginal costs of deposit
collection for individual banks have certainly been a key driving force between much of the central bank11
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intermediation observed in the last years (more than shifts in the marginal costs of loan provision). Good-
friend and McCallum (2007) also derive explicitly the spread between deposit and loan rates on the basis
of assumptions on the production function for bank intermediation services, whereby, as Woodford (2010),
they focus on the cost of loan provision (and not deposit collection). They assume a perfectly competitive
banking system (as in the present model) but constant returns to scale.
2.4 The central bank as interbank intermediary and the length of the central
bank balance sheet
Inspired by recent central bank practice, a literature has developed which studies in general the role of the
central bank balance sheet length and composition as monetary policy instrument (see e.g. C´ urdia and
Woodford, 2010). The present paper also studies one dimension of the length and composition of the central
bank balance sheet as means of monetary policy. In the present model, the length of the central bank balance
sheet, as driven by the width of the standing facilities corridor relative to the interbank market transaction
costs, will have eﬀects on the stance of monetary policy (although in a diﬀerent way then in the model of
C´ urdia and Woodford, 2010).
The present paper puts forward a variant of the argument espoused by Rochet and Tirole (1996) and
Hoerova and Monnet (2010) stressing that if the overnight deposit market is substituted by central bank
operations, then the length of the central bank balance sheet will increase markedly, and the central bank will
need to monitor the risks inherent in the relevant exposures instead, even though there is no reason to expect
that the central bank has a comparative advantage in counterparty monitoring and credit risk management –
probably the contrary. We believe the usefulness of having exposures being monitored in the interbank market
is therefore a matter of comparative advantage, and not one relating to the usefulness of monitoring per se.
Therefore, if the central bank takes over the intermediation role, the credit risk management for unsecured
bank overnight exposures will either get poorer, with an implied higher likelihood of credit losses for society
(and inferior projects getting more funding) or a higher total resource cost of credit risk management in
society. The size of this potential phenomenon – the central bank becoming the credit risk manager of the
economy – should not be underestimated. For instance, in August 2010, the total consolidated deposits with
euro area monetary ﬁnancial institutions (“MFIs”) amounted to around EUR 10,300 billion, while total debt
instruments issued (to the rest of the world) stood at EUR 2,900 billion. Eurosystem funding was around
EUR 600 billion. Loans of banks to euro area residents stood at around EUR 12,000 billion. Finally, loans
from MFIs to MFIs (according to the aggregate MFI balance sheet of the euro area MFIs) were around EUR
1,500 billion (all data from ECB Monthly bulletin, statistical annex). This gives an idea what potential12
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Table 1: Example of potential lengthening of central bank balance sheet, two banks, euro area magnitudes
in terms of banking system balance sheets (in billion of euro)
Pre-crisis Crisis component I (*) Crisis component II(**)
Bank liabilities
Bank 1 Bank 2 Bank 1 Bank 2 Bank 1 Bank 2
Deposits and debt issued 8,400 4,800 8,400 4,800 13,200 0
Central bank borrowing 0 600 0 2,100 0 6,900
Interbank liabilities 0 1,500 0 0 0 0
Bank assets
Loans to corporates 0 6,900 6,900 6,900 6,900 6,900
Interbank assets 1,500 0 0 0 0 0
Deposits with central
bank 0 0 1,500 0 6,300 0
Minimum length of CB
balance sheet 600 2,100 6,900
*) breakdown of interbank market; **) deposit and debt securities shifts across banks
lengthening of the Eurosystem balance sheet could be experienced if the central bank no longer provides
incentives to banks to balance their liquidity position in the market. A break-down in the interbank market
combined with costless central bank intermediation could sweep the EUR 1,500 billion of interbank loans
into the central bank balance sheet. Moreover, if some banks would discover, in particular during a ﬁnancial
crisis, to no longer be competitive in debt issuance and deposit collection, and if the collateral framework of
the central bank is such as to accept large parts of bank assets, then the Eurosystem balance sheet could in
principle lengthen even more substantially.
Suppose, by way of an illustration of the foregoing considerations, that we have a banking system with
two banks, each of which provides loans of EUR 6,000 billion, and hence has to reﬁnance this amount. On
aggregate, EUR 13,200 billion is ﬁnanced out of deposits and debt instruments, and EUR 600 billion from
the central bank, and interbank credit is EUR 1,500 billion (to replicate the dimensions of the euro area
MFI statistics). Total assets of banks, including loans, are EUR 13,800 (and assume that the rest of the
consolidated balance sheet of the MFI sector is netted there). Table 1 explains how the central bank balance
sheet lengthens if a ﬁnancial crisis breaks out, whereby in a ﬁrst step, interbank markets break down, and in
a second step, all deposits previously held with Bank 2 shift to Bank 1. Again, such developments could be
expected in particular if (i) central bank intermediation is costless, and (ii) the collateral framework is liberal
in the sense that large parts of bank assets are accepted by the central bank (and with moderate haircuts).
As is clear from the inspection of the table, the length of the central bank balance sheet increases under such
circumstances by a factor of 10, and the central bank thereby massively substitutes the market mechanism in
terms of allocation of ﬁnancial resources. In practice, it is diﬃcult to assess how big a transfer of risk would
be associated with such a lengthening of central bank balance sheet. Normally, as shown e.g. by Heinle
and Koivu (2009), central banks aim at being exposed only to minimal (“residual”) risk in their monetary13
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Figure 2: “Intermediation” by the Eurosystem in the form of recourse to the deposit facility by the banking
system, despite the banking system having a net liquidity deﬁcit vis-a-vis the central bank, in million of

















































































































policy operations, as liquidity provision is usually collateralized and haircuts are imposed to protect central
banks from signiﬁcant adverse price changes. Still, typical risk measures would probably increase in such a
case not only on account of skyrocketing total exposure, but also due to an increase in concentration and
issuer-counterparty correlation as well as a fall in average credit rating of the collateral porfolio which would
result from a necessary liberalization of the collateral framework (introduced to accommodate banking sector
liquidity needs). Moreover, the scope for adverse selection phenomena (weaker banks with weaker collateral
borrowing over-proportionally from the central bank) would be multiplied. Thus, central bank risk-taking
would increase far more than proportionately. However, it is not only the bearing of increased risk, but also
the need to actively manage those risks by devising and monitoring an eﬀective risk mitigation framework
– while having no comparative advantage over the market in that respect – that generates social costs.1
Ultimately, supporting this through a zero standing facilities corridor would mean denying the superiority
of the market mechanism for the allocation of resources.
This paper will present a“structural”model of market- and central bank-based ﬁnancial intermediation,
which allows focusing on the eventual eﬀects of the width of the standing facilities corridor on banks’ deposit
collection and loan provision, assuming heterogeneous commercial banks. The relevance of the innovative
approach developed in our paper has been underlined by the behavior of banks during the current ﬁnancial
crisis. Indeed, during the ﬁnancial crisis, central bank“intermediation”, i.e. simultaneous use by the banking
1For more on the optimal conditions a collateral framework should satisfy see Bindseil and Papadia (2007).14
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system of central bank liquidity providing and absorbing operations, became widespread. The following chart
shows the recourse to the Eurosystem deposit facility, despite much larger recourse to liquidity providing
facilities, such that the indicated time series shows the degree of central bank intermediation beyond the
provision of funds necessary to cover the net funding needs of the banking system vis-a-vis the central bank.
Interestingly, the large scale intermediation by the Eurosystem starts only after the collapse of Lehman
Brothers. While a part of this simultaneous recourse may be explained by the maturity transformation that
the Eurosystem intermediation oﬀered (liquidity providing operations up to a year conducted as so-called
“ﬁxed rate full allotment” operations in which counterparties always get the requested quantity, liquidity
absorbing operations with overnight maturity), another part is explained by the fact that some banks with
a large amount of illiquid assets, could no longer reﬁnance suﬃciently through retail deposit collection or
capital market issuance. Moreover, cash-rich banks were unwilling to provide their excess funds to those
banks under funding stress due to perceived credit risks, or prohibitive costs of managing these credit risks.
The result was a simultaneous long-term recourse of the banking system to both liquidity providing and
liquidity absorbing facilities. This two-sided recourse is obviously not related to daily liquidity shocks (as
modeled in a stochastic setup such as e.g. in Bindseil and Jablecki, 2011) but to a long-term inability of some
banks to ﬁnd a cheaper way than central bank intermediation to address their funding issues – a feature that
is explained in our present, “structural”, modeling framework.
3 The economic and ﬁnancial sectors in the structural model
The model assumes one household, one corporate, two banks and one central bank, and allows to derive
eﬀects of the corridor width decision of the central bank on (i) the volume of interbank activity; (ii) the
length of the central bank balance sheet, (iii) retail deposit collection and lending to corporates; (iv) social
welfare. The model is driven by the heterogeneity of banks in terms of deposit collection and corporate
lending technology. At the same time, interbank transaction costs and other structural ﬁnancial features of
the economy matter. In this section the four types of economic agents are subsequently introduced.
3.1 The household
The household and the corporate both represent the real economy in the sense that they are the only agents
in the model that hold real assets. At the outset, only the household holds real assets, namely equal to its15
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equity, but then the household is assumed to diversify into ﬁnancial assets: deposits with the two banks, and
banknotes (Table 2). While the quantity of the latter is assumed to be ﬁxed, the former is derived according
to a simple preference function of the household. The household has no own preferences on how to distribute
its deposit holdings with the two banks. Instead, the allocation will depend on the relative competitiveness
of the deposit collection technologies of the two banks (see below).
When the household decides to hold ﬁnancial assets instead of real assets, the real assets will end up with
the corporate. Indeed, the corporate loan volume of the banking system will be equal to total deposits of
households and banknotes (the latter is equal to the net lending of the central bank to the banks).
To keep the model as simple as possible, the deposit supply of the household is assumed to be proportional
to the interest rate oﬀered by banks (b being a positive constant):
DS = fS(i)=bi (1)
Say that this reﬂects the opportunity costs of giving up real assets (beyond the ones given up to be
able to hold banknotes). Inverted, one obtains the marginal valuation, or opportunity cost, curve of deposit
holdings of the household: iMV,D = D
b . Total deposits of households with banks are split up into deposits
with the two banks, respectively, i.e. D = D1 + D2, whereby the split up will be explained when presenting
the banking system.
Table 2: Balance sheet of the household
The household
Assets Liabilities
Banknotes B Equity E
Deposits Bank 1 D1
Deposits Bank 2 D2
Real assets E − D1 − D2 − B
3.2 The corporate
The demand for loans by corporates is assumed to be analogously simple (R and d being two positive
constants):
LD = fD(i)=R − di (2)
Again, one may invert this to obtain a marginal valuation curve: iMV,L = R−L
d , and also again, the total
loan volume is split up into the two banks, whereby the split up will result from the relative competitive
advantages of the two banks: L = L1 + L2.16
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Assuming for a moment that we would be in a ”zero transaction cost world” in which intermediation is
costless – we could simply set demand equal supply to obtain: i∗ = R−B
b+d and D∗ = L∗ −B =
b(R−B)
b+d . With
positive intermediation costs, the outcome is slightly more complicated, and will be case dependent.
As the initial amount (value) of real assets in the economy is equal to the household equity E,a n ds i n c e
this amount always remains the same, and since only households and the corporates will hold real assets, the
real assets of the corporate L1+L2 will have to be equal to the households’ ﬁnancial assets, i.e. to D1+D2+B.
Table 3: Balance sheet of the corporate sector
The corporate
Assets Liabilities
Real assets L1 + L2 Bank loans L1 + L2
3.3 Two banks
It is assumed that banks have (potentially) three types of assets: loans to corporates (L), interbank loans
(Y ), and deposits with the central bank (CBD). They also have (potentially) three types of liabilities:
deposits from households (D); interbank liabilities (Y ); recourse to a central bank borrowing facility (CBB;
t h em a t u r i t yo fw h i c hi sn o tr e l e v a n ti nt h ep r e s e n tm o d e l ,i . e . i td o e sn o tm a t t e ri fw eh a v ei nm i n da n
overnight facility, or open market operations at a longer maturity applying the ﬁxed rate full allotment
procedure).
Financial intermediation is costly and it is assumed that banks incur costs both when collecting deposits
and when granting loans. The marginal cost functions of the two banks diﬀer and are given by: cD
1 =
k1D1; cD
2 = k2D2; cL
1 = p1L1; cL
2 = p2L2,w h e r ecD
j is the marginal cost function of bank j in collecting
deposits, and cL
j is the marginal cost function of bank j in providing loans to corporates, with kj,p j (j =1 ,2)
being positive constants.
Assuming fully competitive bank behavior, the deposit and loan provision volumes of the banks will
maximise social welfare gains from ﬁnancial intermediation. This assumes, in principle, that marginal costs
of deposit collection and marginal costs of loan provision are in equilibrium equal across banks. This will
however hold only under certain circumstances (see below).
Before bringing the central bank and the interbank market into the picture, the problem is thus to
maximise social welfare by choosing D1,D2,L 1,L 2 (with D1 = L1 and D2 = L2,a n dD1,D2,L 1,L 2 > 0).
The assumption of an interbank market allows to soften the constraint D1 = L1 and D2 = L2 into D1+D2 =
L1+L2. At the same time, we need to make an assumption on interbank transaction costs, and deduct them17
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Table 4: Balance sheet of Bank 1 and Bank 2
Bank 1
Assets Liabilities
Loans to corporate L1 Household’s deposits D1
Interbank lending Y Interbank borrowing 0
CB deposit facility CBD1 CB borrowing CBB1
Bank 2
Assets Liabilities
Loans to corporate L2 Household’s deposits D2
Interbank lending 0 Interbank borrowing Y
CB deposit facility CBD2 CB borrowing CBB2
from total welfare gains. Call Y the interbank lending volume from Bank 1 to Bank 2 (if Bank 2 is the net
lender, then this number is negative). Assume that marginal interbank lending costs are constant, namely
u. Hence, total costs of interbank trading will be uY .2
3.4 The central bank
The central bank issues banknotes, which are demanded by households, who can oﬀer real assets in exchange.
The demand of households for banknotes is assumed to be exogenous, as indeed, banknotes in circulation
stayed relatively stable during the entire ﬁnancial crisis 2007-2010. It is furthermore assumed that neither
the central bank, nor the banks are interested in holding real assets. Therefore, real assets not held by the
household will end up with corporates, to which banks lend.
The borrowing of banks from the central bank matching the amount of banknotes will further modify
the constraints inherent in the balance sheets of the economic actors. In fact, if the banking system has a
liquidity deﬁcit vis-a-vis the central bank (and there is no deposit facility, or no reason to use it), then the
constraint D1+D2 = L1+L2 is now replaced by D1+D2+CBB1+CBB2 = L1+L2 and CBB1+CBB2 = B
is equal to banknotes in circulation (CBBi is the borrowing of bank i from the central bank). It is implied
that loans are always equal to the sum of deposits collected and banknotes in circulation: L = D+B.I ft h e
central bank oﬀers both a borrowing facility and a deposit facility, but at diﬀerent rates, there can be cases,
as we will see, of one bank depositing with the central bank and one borrowing from the central bank.
Of course the central bank will have operational costs as well, and these may increase with the amount lent
to banks. Marginal costs of central bank lending may be assumed to be constant, while central bank deposit
collection may be assumed to be costless. When lending, central banks need to manage their credit risk
2In the following system of ﬁnancial accounts, for the sake of presentational simplicity, we assume that Bank 1 lends to
Bank 2, if at all, and not the other way round. But of course a priori also Bank 2 could lend to Bank 1. In view of positive
transaction costs of interbank trading, it would never make sense to lend in both directions at once.18
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Table 5: Central bank balance sheet
Central bank
Assets Liabilities
Borrowing of banks CBB1 + CBB2 Banknotes B
Deposit facility CBD1 + CBD2
through close monitoring, establishing and implementing a collateral framework, and in taking discretionary
risk control measures if necessary; when collecting deposits, central banks do not take credit risks, and do
not need to compete for deposits as banks have to. What matters is that intermediation by the central bank
is not costless. Speciﬁcally, we assume that while in normal times the marginal cost of central bank lending
is likely to exceed market transaction costs (reﬂecting the lack of comparative advantage in risk management
on the part of the central bank), in times of market stress both costs increase and additionally the relation
between them is reverted, i.e. central bank intermediation becomes relatively competitive. Speciﬁcally, we
assume that if v is the constant marginal cost of central bank lending, then in normal times v>u ,w h i l e
in crisis times this is reverted with all costs increasing vcrisis <u crisis.T h e s p r e a d w (“width”) between
the two central bank facilities is to be distinct from these social costs of central bank intermediation. The
spread will aﬀect the actual behavior of banks, and will lead, strictly speaking, to a distortion, whenever
it is not at the level of the marginal costs of intermediation by the central bank. This distortion will be
zero in many cases, namely if the cost of interbank intermediation is anyway lower than the cost of central
bank intermediation (which itself is below the width of the corridor), and no recourse to the central bank
deposit facility takes place. From the perspective of the ”s o c i e t ye xt h ec e n t r a lb a n k ”t h ec o s to ft h eu s eo f
the central bank intermediation is given by: max(CBB1 + CBB2,0)w.
The central bank balance sheet is schematically presented in Table 5.
Before considering now a number of key relevant cases, one may wonder about how the interest rate
obtained relates to the central bank policy/lending rate. The assumption is that the demand and supply
curves reﬂect expectations regarding inﬂation rates, and that interest rate policies of the central bank and
real rates are consistent with these inﬂation expectations. In other words, we assume that the world is in
equilibrium in terms of interest and inﬂation rates. Of course, it could be argued that e.g. changing the
corridor may, if central bank intermediation is relevant, change the interest rate level and ﬁnancial ﬂows, and
is likely to also trigger inﬂation or deﬂation dynamics. This could obviously be added to the present model,
in which it will indeed be shown that loan rates will depend on the costs of ﬁnancial intermediation, which
itself will depend, at least in a ﬁnancial crisis in which interbank markets break down, on the width of the
corridor set by standing facilities, and hence the inter-bank intermediation oﬀered by the central bank.19
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4 The equilibrium ﬁnancial intermediation in the structural model
The equilibrium ﬁnancial intermediation, i.e. the level of deposits, loans, and respective interest rates (and
hence the spread between the two) will be determined by the intersection of the gross demand curve for
intermediation and the supply curve of such services. The gross demand curve is exogeneous to the ﬁnancial
sector, and rather simply established. We assume that loan demand is in any case strong enough to support
some extent of intermediation including deposit collection from households. The gross rent from deposit-








db D. The supply curve of intermediation services, i.e. the marginal cost
curve of the (competitive) banking system taking into account the central bank issuance of banknotes and
possible intermediation through standing facilities, is slightly more complex as we obtain a linear marginal
cost curve with two kinks. The intermediation supply curve is characterized in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. Financial intermediation supply schedule
Let cT,0→K1(D), cT,K1→K2(D),a n dcT,K2→∞(D) denote the three linear segments of the continuous
total marginal cost curve, and K1=( DK1,c T,K1) and K2=( DK2,c T,K2), the Deposit - total marginal
cost combinations characterizing the two kink points. Assume that Bank 1 has a comparative advantage
(disadvantage) in deposit collection (loan provision) in the sense that k1
p1 < k2
p2 ⇔ k1p2 <k 2p1.T h e n ,
under the assumptions spelled out in the previous section, the aggregate banking system’s marginal cost
of intermediation services between the households and corporates is a continuous, monotonously increasing
function in the total deposit volume intermediated, cT(D) (T for Total marginal cost) with three linear
segments characterized as follows, and using the following notation:
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cT,K1→K2 = cT,K1 +
(k1 + p1)(k2 + p2)
k1 + k2 + p1 + p2
(D − DK1)( 5 )







k1 + p1 + k2 + p2
k2p1 − k1p2
,c T,K1 + u
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Interbank trading will be:









Proposition 2. Under the assumptions taken, there exists a unique ﬁnancial intermediation equilibrium
determined by the intersection between the demand schedule for intermediation services q(D)=R−B
d − b+d
bd D
and the aggregate supply schedule as characterised in Proposition 1. The equilibirum fully characterises the
ﬁnancial accounts of the economy, i.e. including total household deposits with banks D1, D2,l o a np r o v i s i o n
of banks to the corporate L1, L2, recourse to the central operations by the banks CBD1, CBD2 CBB1,
CBB2, household deposit rates iD and corporate loan rates iL, and the extent of interbank intermediation
(either in the form of an interbank market Y or two sided recourse to central bank intermediation).
The propositions are derived in the annex. Figure 3 illustrates the three linear segments of the cost
of intermediation curve. The slope of the ﬁrst segment corresponds to the slope of the third one. The
intermediate segment has a steeper slope. The intuition behind the three segments and the kink points is as
follows.
First segment and ﬁrst kink point: Comparative advantages of banks on both sides of their
balance sheet can be fully reaped thanks to some costless interbank intermediation
In this segment, the comparative advantages of banks in deposit collection and loan provision can be fully





2 ). The costless bridge between the banks that allows maintaining this condition until the ﬁrst
From kink point 1 to kink point 221
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Total marginal cost of intermediation
Gross marginal rent from intermediation
kink point is the allocation of central bank funding between the two banks, i.e. the two banks will share the
central bank borrowing in such a way to maintain equality of marginal costs across banks on both sides of the
balance sheets. This implies that the bank with a comparative advantage in deposit collection will borrow
a lower share from the central bank than the one with comparative advantage in loan provision. It may be
noted that if a costless interbank intermediation technology is available, then the total marginal cost curve of
the provision of banking services continues as in the ﬁrst segment and no kinks ever appear. Such a costless
technology is either given by a perfectly eﬃcient interbank market, or by a zero width interest rate corridor.
The implied interbank lending volumes or the implied double-sided recourse to the two standing facilities
can be easily calculated following the approach above for the splitting of the central bank borrowing.
Second segment and second kink point: Growing divergence of marginal cost until interbank
intermediation sets in
Once the split up of the total liquidity deﬁcit of the banking system vis-a-vis the central bank has been
used up as bridge to ensure equality of marginal cost, the banking businesses of the two banks will grow
for a while independently - and this makes up the second linear segment of the total marginal cost curve.
Independent growth means that additional loans provided by Bank 1 are ﬁnanced precisely by additional
deposit collection of Bank 1, and additional loans extended by Bank 2 are ﬁnanced precisely by additional
deposits collected by Bank 2. This will lead immediately to a growing divergence of marginal costs across
banks on both sides of their balance sheets and will continue until the diﬀerence in the marginal costs justiﬁes
interbank intermediation, which itself is not free of cost. For instance, bid ask spreads in the short term22
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unsecured interbank market are at the order of magnitude of 5 to 10 basis points in normal times, and much
higher in crisis times (and even prohibitive for many banks). Eﬃcient extension of bank intermediation
with two banks having to expand their business separately needs to follow the condition of equality of total
marginal cost across banks. The split up of the total growth of bank intermediation needs to be inversely
proportional to the marginal cost growth, such that total marginal costs stay equal across banks. Respecting
this condition, the total marginal cost of intermediation grows from kink point 1 to kink point 2 as stated
by Proposition 2.
Third segment: Growing interbank trading to keep the diﬀerence of marginal cost across banks
equal to interbank intermediation costs
As shown in Annex 1, at kink point 2, deﬁned in the proposition above, interbank trading sets in because
the divergence of marginal costs across banks for the two banking activities are higher than transaction
costs. The speed at which, beyond kink point 2, the ﬁve relevant variables (deposit collection of two banks,
loan provision of two banks, and interbank trading) grow such as to minimize total marginal cost of bank
intermediation is derived in Annex 1. Growth of the four activities (deposit collection and loan provision
of each bank) will be again inversely proportional to the growth of marginal cost, and diﬀerences between
marginal cost across banks will stay at the same level – namely marginal interbank intermediation costs
(transaction costs). Total marginal cost of bank intermediation grows again at the speed of segment 1 of the
intermediation supply curve.
5A n e x a m p l e
An example with six scenarios is now provided to illustrate the model and some of the eﬀects that it allows to
capture. Table 6 shows the parameters chosen, and the resulting ﬁnancial accounts of the economy. Annex
2 in addition provides for the ﬁve scenarios the details of the intermediation supply function.
The six speciﬁcations chosen may be described brieﬂy as follows. First, for all speciﬁcations, household
equity, which is equal to the real assets in the economy, is 500, and banknotes in circulation, which is
equal to the liquidity deﬁcit of the banking system vis-a-vis the central bank is 100. Also the parameters
of household supply of deposits, and of corporate demand for loans remain the same for all cases, namely
b = 5000,R= 500, and d = 5000. In all scenarios, Bank 1 has a comparative advantage over Bank 1 in
deposit collection, or equivalently Bank 2 has a comparative advantage compared with Bank 1 in providing23
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1312
March 2011
Table 6: A simulation of the model for six diﬀerent speciﬁcations of parameters
Scenario I II III IV V VI
HH equity E 500 500 500 500 500 500
Banknote demand B 100 100 100 100 100 100
HH preference parameter b 5000 5000 5000 5000 5000 5000
Corporate technology paramater R 500 500 500 500 500 500
Corporate technology paramater d 5000 5000 5000 5000 5000 5000
marg cost depo coll B1 k1 0,010% 0,010% 0,010% 0,010% 0,010% 0,010%
marg cost depo coll B2 k2 0,010% 0,010% 0,200% 0,010% 0,200% 0,200%
marg cost loan prov B1 p1 0,020% 0,010% 0,020% 0,020% 0,020% 0,020%
marg cost loan prov B2 p2 0,005% 0,005% 0,005% 0,005% 0,005% 0,005%
Interbank TAC u 0,10% 0,10% 0,10% 3,00% 3,00% 3,00%
Width of corridor w 2,00% 2,00% 2,00% 2,00% 2,00% 0,10%
Output
Segment of intersection 3 1 3 2 2 3
D∗ 154 159 141 153 120 141
L∗ 254 259 241 253 220 241
Loan-Depo spread 1,8% 1,3% 2,4% 1,9% 3,2% 2,4%
Full balance sheet output
HH Assets Banknotes B 100 100 100 100 100 100
HH Assets Deposit Bank 1 D1 72 79 133 62 107 133
HH Assets Deposit Bank 2 D2 82 79 7 91 13 7
HH Real Asset E − B − D1 − D2 246 241 259 247 280 259
HH Liabs Equity E 500 500 500 500 500 500
Bank 1 Assets Loans to Corp L1 55 86 52 62 107 52
Bank 1 Assets Interbank lend Y 17 0 81 0 0 0
Bank 1 Assets deposits CB CBD1 0 0 0 0 0 81
Bank 1 Liabs deposits HH D1 72 79 133 62 107 133
Bank 1 Liabs borrow from CB CBB1 0 7 0 0 0 0
Bank 2 Assets Loans to Corp L2 200 172 188 191 113 188
Bank 2 Liabs deposits HH D2 82 79 7 91 13 7
Bank 2 Liabs interb boddow Y 17 0 81 0 0 0
Bank 2 Liabs borrow from CB CBB2 100 93 100 100 100 181
Corporate Assets Real L1 + L2 254 259 241 253 220 241
Corporate Liabs loan from Bank 1 L1 55 86 52 62 107 52
Corporate Liabs loan from Bank 2 L2 200 172 188 191 113 188
CB Assets lending Bank 1 CBB1 0 7 0 0 0 0
CB Assets lending Bank 2 CBB2 100 93 100 100 100 181
CB Liabs Banknotes B 100 100 100 100 100 100
CB Liabs Deposits Bank 1 CBD1 0 0 0 0 0 8124
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1312
March 2011
loans, in the sense that k1
p1 < k2
p2.
Scenario I is the base case for all other scenarios. “normal” case, whereby Bank 2 has a comparative
advantage in providing loans. Deposit collection costs are the same for the two banks. The banking
system collects deposits of 154, and provides loans of 254. It charges a spread between deposit collection
rates and corporate loan rates of 1.8%. Total interbank trading is 17.1, i.e. Bank 1 lends to Bank 2 this
amount, reﬂecting the higher productivity of Bank 2 in providing corporate loans. It is important to
note that the recourse to interbank borrowing by Bank 2 is not out of weakness, but out of comparative
advantages regarding asset side activities (of course, one could also have obtained interbank ﬂows in
the same direction by assuming that banks 1 and 2 are identical in terms of loan provision technology,
but Bank 2 is less eﬃcient in terms of deposit collection).
Scenario II illustrates that the absence of an interbank market may be the result of too low relative
diﬀerence in costs between the two banks in deposit collection and loan provision. Indeed, the only
diﬀerence to speciﬁcation I is that the marginal cost of loan provision of Bank 1 is now half of the
previous case (still the double of Bank 2). Interbank trading falls to zero, as the intersection between
the marginal cost curve of ﬁnancial intermediation and gross marginal gains from intermediation is in
the second segment of the intermediation supply curve.
Speciﬁcations III, IV, and V all illustrate ﬁnancial crisis cases. Speciﬁcation III reﬂects the case in
which Bank 1 has e.g. a bad press and depositors have doubts on its solvency. The result is a sort of
depositor run without dynamics, captured in the model by a strong increase (a multiplication by 20) of
deposit collection costs. The result is a reduced volume of ﬁnancial intermediation and higher deposit-
loan rate spreads, but increasing interbank volumes. It should be noted that the reduced volume of
ﬁnancial intermediation is translated in the model to a smooth return of real assets to the household.
As we know, ﬁnancial crisis dynamics are more complex than that, and asset ﬁre sales by corporates
will be diﬃcult. Instead, corporates could default for liquidity reasons.
In speciﬁcation IV, only interbank transaction costs increase relative to case I, namely by a factor of
30, surpassing the level of the typical width of the corridor of the central bank standing facilities (of
central banks applying a wide corridor). This case thereby also illustrates the one in which interbank
markets break down totally, and the central bank may take over the structural intermediation role
between banks. However, in this scenario, interbank intermediation costs are in any case so high that
there is no such intermediation, i.e. again, the intersection between the intermediation supply and
demand curves is in the second segment of the latter.25
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Case V is the one of a full-blown ﬁnancial crisis, in which both a “static” run on Bank 1 takes place,
and interbank transaction costs increase dramatically. Total ﬁnancial intermediation decreases further,
and the spread between deposit rates and corporate loan rates increases to a new record level. If indeed
it is the central bank which took over the interbank intermediation role, then the width of the corridor
is now directly decisive for ﬁnancial intermediation volumes, deposit-loan spreads, and the length of
the central bank balance sheet.
In scenario VI, the central responds to the crisis by lowering the width of its standing facilities corridor
to 10 basis points. As a consequences, the ﬁnancial accounts and the deposit-repo spread return to
their scenario III values. (Only two items diﬀer in the ﬁnancial accounts between scenarios III and VI:
interbank lending is substituted by two sided recourse of the banking system to the central bank.)
Scenario VI in the previous section illustrated how in a ﬁnancial crisis in which central bank interbank
intermediation is relevant, the width of the corridor has a direct bearing on the stance of monetary policy.
Indeed, the wider the corridor, the higher will be the interest rate applied to loans, and the lower will be the
total volume of credit granted to the banking system. The eﬀect of the increase of the relevant interbank
intermediation spread on loan interest rates can in principle be neutralised either by narrowing the standing
facilities corridor, or via a lowering of the overall interest rate level.
Figure 4 illustrates, starting from case III (or VI), how changes in the width of the interest rate corridor
aﬀect the total volume of ﬁnancial intermediation, the extent of double recourse to the central bank (i.e.
interbank intermediation through the central bank balance sheet, as measured through the recourse to the
central bank deposit facility), and the deposit-loan rate spread.
The charts show that starting from a zero spread, the ﬁnancial intermediation and the central bank
interbank intermediation both decline linearly. These reﬂect diﬀerent points of intersection between the
aggregate supply and demand curves for ﬁnancial intermediation which are all located in the third segment
of the supply curve. When the width of the central bank corridor reaches 160 basis points, this changes
in the sense that no recourse to interbank intermediation takes place any longer, reﬂecting that the new
equilibrium is at an intersection of demand and supply in the second linear segment of the intermediation
supply curve. Unsurprisingly, a further widening of the width of the standing facilities corridor makes no
diﬀerence as the facilities are unattractive anyway. The deposit-corporate loan spread also reﬂects these two
regimes. It ﬁrst increases linearly with the increase of the width of the standing facilities corridor, and then
reaches a plafond at 320 basis points (when the width of the corridor reaches 160 basis points).
It should be noted that over and above such simple numerical examples, the recent crisis provides a
good opportunity to investigate the impact of standing facilities corridor on interbank turnover, since it has26
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1312
March 2011
Figure 4: The volume of ﬁnancial intermediation (left-hand panel) and the spread between the household
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prompted a number of central banks to ease the conditions on which their standing facilities operate (or
create such facilities if none had been in place). For example, the ECB and the Hungarian Central Bank
(MNB) have both narrowed and then widened their respective corridors over the course of the turmoil. The
impact of the latter policies is investigated empirically by Bindseil and Jablecki (2011) who ﬁnd that in each
case there is a strong statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect of falling turnover in response to a reduction in corridor
width. Additionally, turnover correlates negatively with interbank intermediation and a structural break can
be identiﬁed, with both the slope and intercept changing after the failure of Lehman Brothers in September
2008.
6 Conclusions
The current ﬁnancial crisis suggested that large scale double-sided recourse to central bank standing
facilities may occur in a persistent manner over a long period of time, and therefore seems to indicate
structural diﬀerences between banks and the inability to achieve arbitrage across banks’ marginal costs
through money market transactions. The structural model presented provides a very simple and relevant
intuition for why in a ﬁnancial crisis, in which both interbank transaction costs increase dramatically (to
be prohibitive for many banks), and also diﬀerences between banks with regard to outside funding options
intensify, a sudden massive central bank intermediation is demanded by the banking system.27
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The paper proposes a structural model which captures empirically relevant elements of these trade-oﬀs.
The model is based on a closed system of ﬁnancial accounts with sectors represented including households,
corporates, the banking system (represented by two banks) and the central bank. This ensures that the
eﬀects of structural diﬀerences of competitiveness within the banking system and/or liquidity shocks are
reﬂected comprehensively in the entire ﬁnancial system, in contrast to partial models in which some eﬀects
on the ﬁnancial system may be missed. Interbank transaction costs are a key determinant of an optimal
width of the standing facilities corridor. Indeed, central bank intermediation is in some way a substitute for
interbank markets, and therefore the relative level of costs between the two tends to be crucial.
The structural model helps to explain long term two sided recourses to central bank facilities, as they
were observed notably in the euro area during the ﬁnancial turmoil from Fall 2008 to 2010. It also explains
why, structurally, some banks are short and some banks are long in the interbank money market. The
model captures the interaction between static diﬀerences of competitiveness within a heterogeneous banking
system and the monetary policy implementation framework, and yields testable predictions on the eﬀects of a
ﬁnancial crisis on interbank market activity and on the length of the central bank balance sheet. In particular,
the model allows to explain the reduced interbank volumes and the long-term ﬁnancial intermediation by
the Eurosystem after September 2008, and also why in the ﬁrst part of the crisis, namely between August
2007 and August 2008, the short term interbank market witnessed an increase in volumes.
In a ﬁnancial crisis in which interbank markets break down, the model predicts that the narrower the
standing facility corridor, (i) the larger will be the central bank intermediation volume; (ii) the lower will
be the interbank lending volume; (iii) the higher will be the total intermediation between households and
corporates achieved by the ﬁnancial system, and (iv) the lower will be the interest rates to be paid by
corporates for obtaining loans. The latter two also mean that the narrower the corridor, the lower will be
the contraction via ﬁnancial intermediation triggered by a ﬁnancial crisis. The structural model presented
in this paper adds to Berentsen and Monnet (2008) and C´ urdia and Woodford (2010) another powerful link
between implementation technique and the stance of monetary policy, and how policy can react to this by
using the width of the corridor and/or the length of the central bank balance sheet as an independent policy
variable.
Annex 1: Proof of propositions
Proof of Proposition 1
The proof will be provided for each segment of the supply curve of bank intermediation services.28
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First segment of the supply curve
To achieve equality of marginal cost, in view of the marginal cost functions of banking activities of
the two banks, the respective size of banking operations of the banks always needs to be inversely





p1 By substitution, one obtains that the











(D + B) (10)
Thus, the total marginal cost of ﬁnancial intermediation is given by:












The ﬁrst kink point is reached in this case only if  CBB2 = B, i.e. the unconstrained central bank
borrowing by Bank 2 reaches the level of banknotes in circulation. We ﬁrst characterize the ﬁrst kink
point. This is when the banknotes in circulation are “exhausted” as source to equilibrate marginal
cost conditions across banks. The “exhaust” point can be translated into CBB2 = B; CBB1 =0 ,
which implies L1 = D1 and D2 = L2 + B. At the same time, we know that in this point, still
D1 = k2





p1+p2L. Thus, by substitution we can show that












Note that as it was assumed that it was Bank 2 which had used all the central bank credit available,
it must have had comparative advantages in loan provision and comparative disadvantages in deposit
collection. Hence, the denominator p1k2 − p2k1 must be positive. From total amounts, individual
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Second linear segment of the supply curve
By deﬁnition, after kink point 1 is reached, and before interbank trading kicks in, each banking business
needs to grow separately, i.e. for each bank taken separately, deposits and loan volumes must grow in
parallel. At the same time, the businesses of the two banks will not grow at an identical speed, but in
a way that is inversely proportional to their respective total marginal cost, such that their marginal
total cost stay identical, thereby minimizing social marginal costs (total marginal costs of the banking
system). In analogy to the derivation of the common marginal cost function of the banking system in
the ﬁrst segment, the total marginal costs of the banking system are
cT,K1→K2 = cT,K1 +
(k1 + p1)(k2 + p2)
k1 + k2 + p1 + p2
(D − DK1) (14)
This continues over the second linear segment of the supply curve, until the point is reached in which
interbank trading kicks in. Interbank trading kicks in when the gross gains from interbank trading
exceed interbank intermediation transaction costs. One can think of the interbank transaction being
used to re-allocate deposit collection activity from Bank 2 to Bank 1 (as marginal costs in the above-
described eﬃcient pre-interbank market sharing of intermediation are higher in deposit collection for
Bank 2). The marginal gross gain from such a shift in deposit collection can be calculated as follows.
We know that in the segment linear segment of the total marginal cost curves, the growth in banking
business must be subdivided between the two banks as follows:
ΔD1 =
k2 + p2




k1 + k2 + p1 + p2
ΔD (16)
We also know that the diﬀerence between marginal costs of deposit collection will be k1ΔD1 −k2ΔD2.





k1 + k2 + p1 + p2
− k2
k1 + p1
k1 + k2 + p1 + p2

ΔD = u (17)








	 = DK1 + u
k1 + p1 + k2 + p2
k2p1 − k1p2
(18)
By substitution into the marginal cost function prevailing in the second segment:
cT,K2 = cT,K1 +
(k1 + p1)(k2 + p2)
k1 + k2 + p1 + p2
u
k1 + p1 + k2 + p2
k2p1 − k1p2
= cT,K1 + u
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Third linear segment of the supply curve
The increase of deposits and of loans will be split up each into sub-components in a way that the
marginal cost diﬀerences on both sides of activities remain the same across banks – namely equal to
transaction costs. Denote by ΔD(= ΔL) the change of deposit (loan) volume beyond the level in which
interbank trading has kicked in, i.e. ΔD = D−DK2. First, we need to split ΔD between Bank 1 and
Bank 2, α being the share of Bank 1, such that the diﬀerence between the marginal costs of deposit
collection stay the same across banks, namele equal u,a n dk1αΔD = k2(1 − α)ΔD, which implies
α = k2
k1+k2. Second, we need to split up ΔL(= ΔD) between Bank 1 and Bank 2, β being the share
of Bank 1, so that the diﬀerence between marginal costs of loan provision stay the same across banks,
namely equal to u? Reasoning as before, we obtain β =
p2
p1+p2. Interbank lending from Bank 1 to Bank
2 will be equal to: α − β per unit of expansion of intermediation beyond kink point 2. Therefore,









Total increases of marginal costs of the two activities of the entire banking system will now again
correspond to the increases of marginal cost in segment 1. Therefore, total marginal costs of the
banking system beyond the kink point will be:









Proof of Proposition 2
First we derive the demand schedule for intermediation services. The marginal opportunity cost of
depositing with banks is: iMV,D = D
b . The marginal valuation of loans to the corporate is iMV,L = R−L
d =
1
d(R − B − D)). Hence the demand schedule q(D)=iMV,L − iMV,D = R−B
d − b+d
bd D Second, since q(D)
is a monotonously declining function with D(0) > 0a n dcT(D) is monotonously increasing according to
Proposition 1 with cT(0) = 0. From the equilibrium value of D∗ follows L∗ = D ∗ +B. total net central
bank borrowing is equal to banknotes, as implied by the central bank balance sheet identity: B = CBB1 +
CBB2 − CBD1 − CBD2. The disaggregation of the total deposit and loan amounts has to be done one by
one for each of the three segments of the intermediation supply schedule. If the intersection is not in segment
3 of the intermediation supply schedule, but in segment 1 or 2, then only the relevant segments need to be
considered.31
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First linear segment of the supply curve
At D = 0 and L = B, and assuming that Bank 1 is the bank with comparative advantages in deposit
collection, the following sharing of the recourse to central bank operations and of loan provision will
prevail: CBB1 = L1 =
p2
p1+p2B; CBB2 = L2 =
p1
p1+p2B. It can be easily veriﬁed that this ensures
cL
1 = cL
2 , and hence one cannot reduce total aggregate cost of loan provision through a re-allocation
at the margin between the two banks. From D = 0, in view of the marginal cost functions of banking
activities of the two banks, the expansion of banking operations with growing volumes of deposits
always needs to be inversely proportional to the marginal cost factors such as to preserve equality of





p1 The wedge between the
two banks’ central bank borrowing volumes will increase continuously, and at kink point 1 the bank
with a comparative advantage in deposit collection will have no longer any recourse to central bank
borrowing. Hence: CBBK1
1 =0 ;CBBK1










Second linear segment of the supply curve
As shown in the proof of Proposition 1, ΔD1 =
k2+p2
k1+k2+p1+p2ΔD and ΔD2 =
k2+p1
k1+k2+p1+p2ΔD.M o r e -
over, as no interbank intermediation prevails in this segment, ΔL1 =Δ D1 and ΔL2 =Δ D2.
Third linear segment of the supply curve
In line with values of α and β derived in Proposition 1, one obtains ΔD1 = k2




p1+p2ΔD and ΔL2 =
p1
p1+p2ΔD (noting that ΔD =Δ L). Interbank intermediation
takes place either through interbank market or throught the central bank, whereby the relative size
of interbank transaction cost u and v determine which one is positive. If u<v ,t h e nCBD = 0 and








.I f i n s t e a d u>v , then reverse values prevail. If u = v, then the
splitup of interbank intermediation between the two markets is indeterminate (in the examples we
assume that still the interbank market would be used).32
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Annex 2: Details of the intermediation supply schedule
Table 7: Details of the intermediation supply schedule presented in Table 6
Scenario I II III IV V VI
HH equity E 500 500 500 500 500 500
Banknote demand B 100 100 100 100 100 100
HH preference parameter b 5000 5000 5000 5000 5000 5000
Corporate technology paramater R 500 500 500 500 500 500
Corporate technology paramater d 5000 5000 5000 5000 5000 5000
marg cost depo coll B1 k1 0,010% 0,010% 0,010% 0,010% 0,010% 0,010%
marg cost depo coll B2 k2 0,010% 0,010% 0,200% 0,010% 0,200% 0,200%
marg cost loan prov B1 p1 0,020% 0,010% 0,020% 0,020% 0,020% 0,020%
marg cost loan prov B2 p2 0,005% 0,005% 0,005% 0,005% 0,005% 0,005%
Interbank TAC u 0,10% 0,10% 0,10% 3,00% 3,00% 3,00%
Width of corridor w 2,00% 2,00% 2,00% 2,00% 2,00% 0,10%
Characteristics of the intermediation supply curve
total MC at D =0 0,004 0,003 0,004 0,004 0,004 0,004
delta MC D =0→ K1 0,009% 0,008% 0,014% 0,009% 0,014% 0,014%
D at K1 66,67 200,00 26,58 66,67 26,58 26,58
MC at K1 0,01 0,02 0,0076 0,01 0,0076 0,0076
ΔMC D= K1 → K2 0,010% 0,009% 0,026% 0,010% 0,026% 0,026%
D1 share 0 → K1 0,500 0,500 0,952 0,500 0,952 0,952
D2 share 0 → K1 0,500 0,500 0,048 0,500 0,048 0,048
L1 share 0 → K1 0,200 0,333 0,200 0,200 0,200 0,200
L2 share 0 → K1 0,800 0,667 0,800 0,800 0,800 0,800
D at K2 96,67 270,00 32,53 666,67 145,57 32,53
MC at K2 0,013 0,026 0,0092 0,07 0,0387 0,0092
ΔMC D= K2 →∞ 0,009% 0,008% 0,014% 0,009% 0,014% 0,014%
D1 share K1 → K2 0,333 0,429 0,872 0,333 0,872 0,872
D1 share K1 → K2 0,667 0,571 0,128 0,667 0,128 0,128
D2 share K1 → K2 0,333 0,429 0,872 0,333 0,872 0,872
L1 share K1 → K2 0,667 0,571 0,128 0,667 0,128 0,128
L2 share post K2 0,500 0,500 0,952 0,500 0,952 0,952
D2 share post K2 0,500 0,500 0,048 0,500 0,048 0,048
L1 share post K2 0,200 0,333 0,200 0,200 0,200 0,200
L2 share post K2 0,800 0,667 0,800 0,800 0,800 0,800
Gross marginal rent in D =0 0,080 0,080 0,080 0,080 0,080 0,080
Gross marginal rent Int K1 0,053 0,000 0,069 0,053 0,069 0,069
Gross marginal rent Int K2 0,041 -0,028 0,067 -0,187 0,022 0,067
d e l t ao fg r o sm a r gr e n t -0,0004 -0,0004 -0,0004 -0,0004 -0,0004 -0,000433
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